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South Africa’s premier demographic model (the ASSA2003
model) predicts that only in 2008 will HAART coverage reach
50% (see Fig. 1). This does not reflect well on South Africa.
Recent comparative analysis shows that South Africa’s HAART
coverage is below par given its economic, institutional and
epidemiological characterists.3 As illustrated in Fig. 2, South
Africa is among those countries whose HAART coverage is less
than expected given international norms. Although South
Africa comprises a large share (25%) of the total number of
sub-Saharan Africans on HAART (whether in the public,
private or not-for-profit sectors), this comparative analysis
indicates that South Africa should be doing a lot better.
Furthermore, South Africa has performed poorly with regard
to its own domestic targets set by the 2003 Operational Plan.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, by the end of 2005, the numbers of
people on HAART in the public sector was still less than 30%
of the original planned total. 
Part of the problem has to do with procrastination by the
Health Minister with regard to drug procurement. On 2 March
2004, she unveiled her drug procurement timetable to the
parliamentary portfolio committee on health showing that the
earliest that drugs would be available for a public sector
rollout was July 2004 (and in the end, the tender was only
finalised in March 2005). It was only after the Treatment
Action Campaign (TAC) threatened legal action that the
provinces were allowed to obtain drug supplies through an
interim tender process.  
South Africa’s public sector HAART rollout is strongly
underpinned by external funding and support – especially in
the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Of the total number of
public sector HAART patients (111 786), 54% were part funded
by external donors (the largest being PEPFAR) working in
partnership with the public sector. The contribution that
donors make to public sector patients varies between donors,
across projects (with some treatment sites being fully funded
by donors, and others simply obtaining targeted support) and
over time. For example, the first public sector donor project,
which was between Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the
Western Cape government, was initially almost entirely funded
and managed by MSF, but over the past few years, the province
has assumed a greater role, with the plan being that as of 2007
the sites will be run entirely by the public sector.6 The Western
Cape government also received funding from the Global Fund
(which was disbursed in October 2004) for six HAART sites
including the sites it was operating in partnership with MSF.
This makes it impossible to disentangle precisely the relative
contribution of government and donor agencies to the HAART
rollout. 
BUDGETING FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR ROLLOUT
National financial data on the HAART rollout are similarly
opaque, with the available information being limited to the
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South African AIDS policy has long been characterised by suspicion on the part of President Mbeki and his Health Ministers
towards antiretroviral therapy.1,2 The Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, resisted the introduction of antiretrovirals
for mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP) until forced to do by a Constitutional Court ruling – and she resisted the
introduction of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) for AIDS-sick people until a cabinet revolt in late 2003 forced her
to back down on this too.  Since then, the public sector rollout of HAART has gained momentum, but it has been uneven across









































Fig. 1. Numbers of people needing and obtaining HAART (mid-
points for each year) whether from the public or the private
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occasional cryptic remark in various
general budget documents. However,
judging from an August 2004 Treasury
document reviewing government
finances,7 sufficient finances were
allocated by the national Treasury to
provincial governments to fund the
Operational Plan. The report states that
a sum of R300 million had been
allocated to the ‘comprehensive HIV
and AIDS programme, ARV rollout in
particular’ for 2004/5. At this stage, the
Treasury would have been working in
terms of the budget provided by the
Operational Plan which proposed to
have 54 000 people on treatment by
March 2004 at a total cost of R296
million.4 This included budgeting for
additional staff, laboratory testing,
antiretroviral drugs, nutritional
supplements, health systems up-
grading, programme management,
capital investment and research. Of
course by late 2004 (when Treasury
finalised its medium-term expenditure
framework) it would have been clear
that the rollout was proceeding far
more slowly and at best was only going
to achieve its March 2004 target a year
later (as had indeed been announced by
President Mbeki in his 2004 State of the
Nation address8). This, together with the
fact that HAART prices had fallen
further since the operational plan was
budgeted, meant that the allocation of
R300 million for the 2004/5 financial
year was more than sufficient to fund
the (delayed-by-one-year) planned
comprehensive rollout.
Yet, by the time March 2005 came
along, the rollout was still only at about
80% of the original first year’s
treatment target (i.e. at about 43 000
people). In other words, more money
had been allocated by the national
Treasury for the comprehensive rollout
in 2004/5 than had been used by the
national and provincial health
departments for that purpose. Despite
this poor showing, the Treasury
continued to be optimistic and
supportive, and allocated enough in
2005/6 to have 150 000 people on
HAART by March 2006,9 while making
the commitment to allocate further
budget to the rollout as it progressed. 
The Treasury’s target of 150 000 HAART
patients in the public sector by March
2006 appears to be spot-on with the
achieved level of 111 786 by the end of
December 2005. The national Treasury
had, in other words, allocated sufficient
resources to fund all of these patients.
Yet as it turned out, the Global Fund,
PEPFAR and various other NGO
Fig. 2. The difference between actual HAART coverage and predicted HAART coverage







































































































Fig. 3. Planned and actual growth in the provision of antiretroviral treatment (sources:













































































partnerships took the pressure off the South African state to
such an extent that only 51 494 HAART patients needed to be
fully covered by the government budget. If we assume that
the average contribution of donors to public sector projects is
50% of the total costs (which is probably an underestimate
given that the Global Fund contributes substantially more to
the Western Cape by paying for drugs, personnel, diagnostic
testing and infrastructure6), then at least a quarter of the
budget allocated by the national treasury for the HAART
rollout was not used for that purpose. 
THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL WILL
According to a recent assessment by the International Treat-
ment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) of South Africa’s HAART
rollout,10 the major constraint is political leadership. The
economic analysis presented here supports the ITPC’s
contention. It suggests very strongly that the overall public
sector rollout in South Africa is not constrained by budgetary
allocations but is instead constrained by ineffective leadership
in the national Department of Health. While it is true that a
rapid and sustained HAART rollout requires additional
investment in, and upgrading of, the public health sector, it is
important to note that this was all budgeted for in the
Operational Plan, and as argued above, existing subsequent
allocations for the rollout by the national Treasury are
consistent with that Operational Plan (although revised
downwards to account for the slow initial pace of the rollout). 
Put bluntly, if the national Health Minister had prioritised
upgrading the health system and rolling out treatment, the
Minister of Finance would have provided her with the funds
and a further 30 000 people (at least) would be on HAART in
the public sector. If the Ministry of Health had managed to roll
out treatment in line with the original planned targets (which
were initially budgeted for by the National Treasury) then an
additional 278 000 people would be on HAART. Instead, the
Health Minister has yet to chart a way forward to address the
human resources crisis in the health sector,11 and has
undermined the HAART rollout yet further by sending out
confusing messages about the relative benefits of HAART,
nutrition and unproven alternative remedies.2,12 She has also
undermined attempts by provinces to access Global Fund
grants6 and has yet to use her powers under the Patents Act
to issue compulsory licences to enable the local production or
importation of generic versions of the patented drugs which
compromise over half of the value of the March 2005 tender.13 
There are strong grounds for concluding that South Africa
could have achieved a much higher HAART coverage than it
has, and that the major constraint on the rollout is political
will. The national Treasury has made resources available to the
Health Minister to facilitate a HAART rollout, yet a significant
proportion of these have not been used for this purpose. The
Health Minister appears to be undermining rather than
energising the rollout. A large part of South Africa’s failure to
achieve a higher HAART coverage must be placed at her door
– and that of President Mbeki, who at the very least is
complicit in so far as keeping her in her post is concerned. 
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